Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
FRANCISCO
P. OCAMPO, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EVELYN S.
ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------x OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EVELYN S.
ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------x OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EVELYN S.
ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City,
and COURT STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C. JAMORA, Regional Trial Court, Branch
144, Makati City, Respondents. x-----------------------------------------x SYLVIA Complainant,
-versus- JUDGE EVELYN S.
ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Respondent. |
A.M. OCA IPI No.
07-2630-RTJ A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC/ Re:
Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 144, A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2093 PUNO,
C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, velasco,
jr., nachura,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 23, 2010 |
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D E C I S I
O N
PER
CURIAM:
These consolidated cases[1]
stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has
been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia
Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the respondent sought
reconsideration. The immediately
preceding case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed
against respondent Judge in a Resolution dated
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
In A.M.
OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the
Ocampo Case), Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment,
grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
In his letter-complaint dated April 24,
2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated
that he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo,
which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
On
During the hearing, upon agreement of the
parties, respondent Judge issued an Order
enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the country
without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan,
visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Since then,
In an Order dated
Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in
an Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring
complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his
wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium,
252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts that would
harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health,
safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly
support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive
of expenses for medication and education.
Francisco Ocampo faulted
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired
when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give
monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if
his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the
absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. In
directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances
relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal
separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.
Francisco Ocampo further
alleged that respondent Judge caused the
implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her
branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to implement the Order.
Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a
Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged into the home of Francisco Ocampos
parents in P50,000.00 right there
and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of money.
Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order,
Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him.
Francisco Ocampo then
filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex parte motion to
recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied
by respondent Judge in an Order dated
April 13, 2007.
The irregular acts
attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows: (1) she denied the motion
to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite overwhelming
evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a resident of Makati City;
(2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons
was served on therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that
therein respondent's period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed; (4) she
ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the
implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even designating a special sheriff to
serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These, coupled with complainant
Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded money from his wife, constitute
the first set of charges filed against her.
In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No.
M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure
Order was issued on
Respondent Judge stated that
the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court calendar was full,
nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before the
court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the presence of the public
prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the suddenness of
the court hearing, respondent Judge
professed that she did not have such intention. The nature of therein
petitioner's prayers required immediate action by the court and the December 8,
2006 Order could have been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as
previously mentioned, was unsuccessful.
Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo
really felt harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he could have complained
during the hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to
the attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint,
or four (4) months after the fact. At
any rate, the scheduled hearing on
Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was
anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into account the
provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal with the
right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children
and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampos contention in his Answer
that he was not contesting his wifes claim that the subject minors were not
his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over the subject
minors to his wife, Milan.
Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in
causing the implementation of the TPO,
as the law itself mandates that the court order the immediate
personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed the implementation
of the TPO was dated
As regards the date, time and manner the
TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judge
maintained that she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would have
been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same date. The
sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability.
Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriffs Report and handwritten notation on the lower
portion of the Order dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad
Artemio S. Zaparita of
Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject
minors may not have been in danger, but were safe in the custody of complainant
Francisco Ocampo. The court arrived at a
preliminary determination that
According to respondent
Judge, Milan Ocampos prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should
be issued by the court on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that such order should be issued.
Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in
favor of P150,000.00,
but the court awarded only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found
reasonable by it. At any rate, the
support granted by the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant
Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to give support as
alleged by
Respondent Judge stated
that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regarding
She further asserted
that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of action taken by the
counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of
procedure. One, on April
10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on
April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex
Parte Motion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24, 2007, he
filed the instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April 26,
2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007
with Ex Parte Motion for Examination
of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24, 2007, filed a Second Motion to
Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that from all appearances,
the administrative complaint was filed for the sole objective of compelling her
to inhibit herself from handling SP No. M-6375.
Three, on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate
Proceedings, which was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really
have any genuine administrative cause of action against her. As things turned
out, all that complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was
their declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the
OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office
of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about
the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
The
said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly
with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child
custody case.
In a Resolution[3] dated June 5, 2007, the
Court resolved to treat the Memorandum of Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock as a complaint for gross ignorance and gross misconduct against Judge
Arcaya-Chua, directed respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint
within 10 days from receipt of notice, and suspended respondent Judge pending
resolution of the administrative case.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent
Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting, among others, the custody of the
subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and
directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and
office of Chang Tan as well as from the
school of the subject minor. Per the sheriff's return dated
According to OCA,
although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang Tan
in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she
was remiss in issuing the TPO. Her
speedy issuance of the Orders dated May
7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in the case, but
it also appeared that the Order dated
May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in
the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144.
OCA also pointed out
that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed unusual
interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch
143,
In her Comment[4] dated June 9, 2007, respondent
Judge explained that SP No. M-6373,
entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v.
Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was
re-raffled to her branch on
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7,
2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as
under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition for
custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs
finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did
not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein
respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the
Application was explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against
Stephanie Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi
wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her mother had committed upon her.
The complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as
well as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning
in detail the acts of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi,
consisted of the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as
well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.
Respondent Judge stated that although
Article 176 of the Family Code provides
that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother,
an exception is when the court orders otherwise. The mother may be divested of
her parental authority over her illegitimate child when the court finds compelling
reasons to do so. In all cases involving a child, his best
interest is of paramount consideration. The court awarded provisional custody
over the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but
effective for a period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the
allegations in the pleadings and the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was
already more than seven years old at the time the Order dated
Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7, 2007
was not speedily issued. As was her standard operating procedure with
respect to newly raffled and re-raffled cases, she immediately studied the
records of SP No. M-6373. Even before
Chang Tan's Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had already arrived at a
preliminary determination that the issuance of a Provisional Order and a TPO was warranted. She also studied Chang Tan's Application on
the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the following
day, a Saturday, also in her office. She
was then planning to avail of her forfeitable leave of absence of 30 days in
June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the previous year. To expedite the resolution of motions and
preparation of decisions, and to avoid being saddled with much work on her
return from her leave, she had been reporting to her office on alternate
Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No. M-6373
was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as
well. Her study of SP No. M-6373 resumed on
Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to implement
the Order dated May
7, 2007 at once, because the courts are so mandated to cause the immediate
implementation of the TPO under Section 15, R.A. No. 9262.
As
regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of Branch
144, respondent Judge surmised that the same could be merely concocted, as it
was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors
of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it
really transpired.
Respondent
Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007,
she gave a directive holding in abeyance
further implementation of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she
really received money or anything from Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf,
she would have ensured complete implementation of the Order dated
Respondent Judge stated that if it were true
that she had been engaged in rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order in her
branch, she and her family would not have found themselves in such state of
financial drain after she had been preventively suspended.
As regards her
participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Moreno, respondent
Judge narrated that an Ex Parte Motion for Immediate Resolution
of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to
her sala being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143. Immediately after reading the
motion, she inquired from the Clerk of Court of Branch 143 about the alleged
leave of absence of therein Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned
that Judge Galapate-Laguilles indeed left for the
Respondent Judge explained that she granted the Application
because the allegations in the complaint were adequately supported by
documentary and testimonial evidence. She received the records of the RCBC Case on
In her Supplemental
Comment[5] dated June 22, 2007,
respondent Judge added that the manner
by which the incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC cases were resolved must not
be taken in isolation, but in relation to the manner all incidents were
resolved and all decisions and orders were rendered in her sala, such that she
resolved all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
In A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit
Case),
a judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports
of alleged irregularities committed by
respondent.
In a Memorandum dated
The initial audit report stated that as
early as
At
In A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies of
marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the period covering January
2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose
of the said copies of marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage
solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages as
verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court
of the said fees in the total amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred
Pesos (P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
per marriage; and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report
of Cases.[6]
In a Resolution[7] dated September 16, 2008, the
Court resolved to consider the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the OCA as a
formal complaint against respondent Judge; require respondents Judge
Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to comment on the Memorandum within 10 days
from notice thereof; and refer A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ and A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge
filed her Affidavit,[8] in lieu of Comment, on the
OCA Memorandum dated August 10, 2007.
Re: Ordering
In
regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
recounted that in the second week of April 2007, she, with the help of Noel
Umipig (a City Hall employee detailed to her sala), started to pack her personal
belongings in anticipation of the impending transfer of her sala from the Gusali
ng Katarungan to the Makati City Hall. She asked Umipig to discard her
piles of yellowish scratch papers.
Umipig put her scratch papers inside big plastic bags and then tied the
bags. They also emptied the steel cabinet in her chambers which contained,
among other things, the files of marriage certificates, as well as official
receipts of the marriage solemnization fees. She previously bundled the said
marriage certificates according to month and year of solemnization of the
weddings, improvising paper bundles for the purpose. Umipig then put all the marriage certificates
inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and placed them in the small room
that was between her chambers and the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it would be easy to
add or get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home
as he was then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him
the bags of scratch papers out of her chambers to be thrown away. The following
morning, she noticed that there were red patches on the face and arms of Umipig
so she did not ask him anymore for help. She removed the official receipts of
the marriage solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped them with
approximately six paper bundles then placed them inside the plastic bags
containing the marriage certificates.
In the first week of May
2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that the transfer to the
About the second week of
May 2007, upon learning that the bags of garbage had accumulated, she reminded
Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away. On
Respondent Judge
stressed that she did not and would not have ordered Indicio to dispose of the
copies of the marriage certificates, citing the haphazard manner in which
Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that she had nothing to hide and
that she would gain nothing by the disposal thereof.
Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization
fees
Respondent Judge averred
that the best proofs of payment of the marriage solemnization fees were the
official receipts. She categorically stated that all the official receipts of
the marriage solemnization fees were inside the plastic bags, together with the
marriage certificates.
She stressed that she
could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, because
it is of public knowledge that she had been solemnizing a big number of
weddings per day, aside from the fact that she had solemnized weddings of
several celebrities, which also included celebrities as sponsors; thus,
attracting the attention of many court employees. She was also aware of the
consequences of solemnizing a marriage without the solemnization fee so she was
very meticulous when it came to checking, among other things, whether there was
an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also knew that the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow the registration
of a marriage certificate if there was no accompanying official receipt of
payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the pervading financial
crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money without demanding
an official receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained about the absence
of the official receipt of the marriage solemnization fee. Further, the Audit Team found from the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all the marriage certificates of the
weddings that she solemnized were duly registered therein.
Respondent Judge also
pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the OCC of the MeTC and RTC
adopted a wrong and unreliable procedure in verifying from their records
whether there was payment of the marriage solemnization fees, simply because
most of the dates of the wedding indicated in the marriage certificates were
not the same as the dates indicated in the official receipts. She explained
that a couple would often pay the
solemnization fee at a certain date, but the solemnization of the wedding would
take place on another date for one reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of
Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court checked the dates from the copies of
their official receipts on file, the dates did not reflect payment of the fees,
because payments were made on dates different from the wedding dates.
Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in
the Monthly Report of Cases
Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases
were typed by her staff, namely: Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and
Criminal-in-Charge Mary Jane Rafael. As regards the number of marriages
solemnized, they would inquire from her and she would then give them the figure
as stated in her own logbook. When the
Reports were turned over to her for signature, she would first verify the
entries from her own logbook before affixing her signature.
Thus, she was
shocked when she learned that the Courts copy of the Reports contained incorrect
figures and was different from that which she signed.
She asserted that she could not have
failed to reflect the correct number of marriages in the Monthly Reports,
because apart from the fact that she was very meticulous in the accuracy of the
entries, she had nothing to gain by not reflecting the correct figures of
solemnized marriages.
She believed that the blank and incorrect
figures appearing in the number of marriages solemnized in the Monthly Reports
from January 2004 to March 2007 were the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably
tampered the same, because of a serious grudge against her. She added that it
was also Umipig who transferred the plastic bags of marriage certificates and
official receipts from the small room to the stenographer's room in an attempt
to expose the big number of weddings that she had solemnized, which, through
his machinations, were not reflected in the Monthly Reports.
Re:
Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of Circular No. 9-98[9]
Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages
inside her chambers or courtroom, and as proof thereof, she pointed to the
entry in the marriage certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On
few occasions, she had also solemnized weddings in a house or place designated
by both contracting parties, but not without the required affidavit of request.
She explained that she was able to solemnize many weddings per day, because the
rites took only about 10 minutes and involved a maximum of eight couples per
batch.
She stressed that neither did she demand
nor receive money for solemnization of marriages, and only the official
receipts of the solemnization fees were given to her.
In regard to Victoria Jamora, she
explained in her Amended Comment dated
1. She
was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua
to be present during the marriage ceremony;
2. She had no personal knowledge of the
actual number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge;
3. She merely relied on the entries in the
Monthly Report as to the number of marriages solemnized. The Monthly Report was prepared by Jane
Rafael, who was in charge of criminal cases.
When she asked Rafael why there were only such number of marriages solemnized from June 2005 to April
2007, Rafael replied that was the advice
of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge
Arcaya-Chua signed the reports. As a
subordinate designated by respondent
Judge as OIC, she was not in a position
to question her superior, Judge Arcaya-Chua,
and signed in good faith the Monthly Reports in question.
The administrative case
was again referred to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigation of the Administrative
Complaints
On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando scheduled the consolidated
cases for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on
During the hearing on
October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), complainant Francisco Ocampo appeared with his
counsel, Atty. Jose Aliling IV, while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe C.
Aguila appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua appeared in her own
behalf. During the said hearing, complainant Ocampo submitted a Supplemental
Affidavit and additional documentary evidence.[10] Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua also furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel with a copy of her
Affidavit, which incorporated her Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental
Comment, the Motion to Recall Preventive Suspension and the Motion to Resolve.
Complainant Ocampo testified on direct examination, affirming the truth of the
contents of his Complaint and the authenticity of the annexes attached thereto.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined him, but reserved further
cross-examination as to the Supplemental Affidavit. Hearing resumed the
following day, October 24, 2008, and respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined
complainant Ocampo specifically on his Supplemental Affidavit. Justice
Salazar-Fernando also asked complainant Ocampo questions.
During the hearing on
October 29, 2008, complainant Ocampo submitted his Offer of Documentary
Evidence. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua testified on direct examination, whereby
she affirmed the statements in her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, and
identified her exhibits, after which, she was cross-examined by complainant Ocampo's
counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case and
formally offered her documentary evidence, insofar as OCA IPI No.
07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the guidance and information of Justice
Salazar-Fernando, the entire original records of SP No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo,
was ordered brought to her office.
On November 3, 2008, OCA
started presenting evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case). Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles
testified and submitted her Affidavit, and was cross-examined, and was asked questions
on redirect-examination. The scheduled hearing for November 4, 2008 was
cancelled due to the unavailability of two (2) witnesses, namely, Judges Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino.
Hearing on the case
resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA presented Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and
Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, who both submitted their Affidavits, which were
considered as their testimony on direct. They were questioned by Justice
Salazar-Fernando and cross-examined by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Court
records pertaining to SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K.S. Chang Tan v.
Stephanie N. Estrella Pulliam, were likewise directed to be brought to the
office of Justice Salazar-Fernando for reference and information.
During the hearing on November 11, 2008,
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati
City, Judge Winlove Dumayas, appeared, and questions were propounded to him by Justice
Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Atty. James Navarrete from
OCA.
In order to expedite the
proceedings, respondent Judge was
allowed to present her defense, and marked in evidence several documents,[11] which formed part of her
direct testimony. Since the documents submitted by respondent Judge were
voluminous, Atty. Navarrete was given until November 20, 2008 to conduct his
cross-examination.
On
On
On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua filed a Counter-Manifestation and Motion to Correct Transcript of
Stenographic Notes.
On January 16, 2009, Justice
Salazar-Fernando received the rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Court Stenographer Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263-RTC, Re:
Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City), which he
noted to have been consolidated with A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per Resolution
of the Court en banc dated
Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not
included in the earlier investigation, Justice Salazar-Fernando set A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141 for hearing on February 8, 2009.
Hearing on A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10, 2009, during which the counsels for OCA and
respondent stenographer Victoria Jamora appeared. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also attended
the hearing.
OCA proposed several
stipulations for admission to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. She admitted that she solemnized marriages
while she was the Judge of the MeTC, Branch 63,
Hearing resumed on
February 18, 2009. OCA presented Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, who testified on
the incident that occurred on
In the hearing of March
3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador Indicio, Jr., Arnel Magsombol, Lucia Ticman and
Joel Gregorio as its witnesses. The witnesses were questioned by OCA,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Justice Salazar-Fernando. Per request of OCA,
notice of hearing was sent to German Averia, for him to appear on the next
scheduled hearing as the last witness of OCA.
In the hearing of
With the continuance of
the investigation on April 8, 2009, OCA presented in evidence the originals of
the monthly reports, and the certified
true copies of the monthly reports, whose originals were unavailable. OCA, thereafter, rested its case. In the same
hearing, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her exhibits.[15] She manifested that her Affidavit and
Supplemental Affidavit would serve as her testimony on direct examination.
On April 21, 2009,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented additional exhibits.[16] Her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, as
well as the Affidavit of her son, Robert Maurice Chua, formed part of their
direct testimonies. Respondent Judge was,
thereafter, cross-examined by OCA.
During the hearing on
May 5, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua offered in evidence her Second
Supplemental Affidavit. She also presented additional exhibits.[17] Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's daughter, Beau Mairi Chua testified, with her Affidavit
constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by
the opposing counsel. Respondent Jamora also testified as witness for
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
At the resumption of the
hearing on May 18, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recalled respondent
Jamora to the stand and propounded additional questions. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua rested her case after respondent Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, testified in
her own behalf, with her Amended Comment constituting her direct
testimony. No cross-examination was
conducted on her by OCA. Respondent
Jamora, thereafter, rested her case.
With the conformity of
the parties, Justice Salazar-Fernando directed them to file their respective
memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her memorandum on
Findings of the Investigating Justice
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No.
07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case)
In
regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the Ocampo Case, without
necessarily ruling on the correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas Order, Justice
Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge's disposition thereof fell
within the ambit of discretion vested upon her as a judge. Not giving credence to
the evidence presented by the movants with respect to the residence of Milan
Ocampo was well within her judicial discretion. Assuming the same was
erroneous, no administrative liability attached thereon in the absence of sufficient
evidence that she ruled in such manner, because of a corrupt or dishonest
motive, bad faith, fraud or malice. The evidence presented by complainant
Ocampo as to Milan's residence might constitute proof of her "domicile,"
but such evidence was not necessarily irreconcilable with the fact that Milan might be maintaining residence
elsewhere other than Meycauayan, Bulacan, considering her estranged
relationship with complainant Ocampo.
As regards the alleged suddenness
of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable. The order setting the case for hearing on
According to the
Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg
to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
correctly stated that the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the
filing of the application after ex parte determination by the judge that
the same be issued. This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary
Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the court on
the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such
order should be issued. A court may
grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall
be effective for thirty (30) days. The
court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date
of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate
personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may
obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The
TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO.[18]
Hence, the issuance
of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before complainant Ocampo could
file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
Justice
Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary determination
of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the
illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived
through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or
ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision
of the Family Code states:
ART.
164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
Children
conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of
the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the
husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
Moreover, Milan
Ocampo appended evidence of complainant
Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent behavior. A sworn affidavit[19] of Emelita S. Valentino,
narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant Ocampo, as well as the
certification[20]
from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence
committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were appended to the Petition. The
totality of the evidence thus presented, while not exactly conclusive,
justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of a TPO.
While Justice
Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's objections to the matter of support apt and plausible, the same could be merely considered as an
error of judgment or an abuse of discretion, but respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
cannot be held administratively liable thereon. Considering that the matter of
support therein was merely provisional, respondent Judge could not be faulted
for readily granting the prayer for support without further evaluating evidence
with respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's error in that respect was not
gross, the same having been brought
about by an innocuous reliance on the Rule on Provisional Orders, A.M. No.
02-11-12-SC. Under the said rule, provisional orders for protection and support
may be issued without hearing. However, the said rule specifically
applies to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of
marriage or legal separation. In this
case, the matter of support was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.
Justice Salazar-Fernando
found that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's alleged over-zealousness in causing
the immediate implementation of the TPO was without solid basis. A TPO, much
like a TRO in civil cases, is required to be served immediately, precisely to
serve its purpose as a protective relief. Respondent Judge issued the TPO on April 3, 2007, a Holy
Tuesday, right after the hearing on complainant Ocampo's motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion to dismiss.
She clarified that the date of the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's
counsel himself. The following day,
Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that
respondent Judge could not have been privy to the brazen manner in which the
TPO was served by the designated sheriff.
In the first place, it was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff
Tangangco, who was administratively charged by complainant Ocampo for the allegedly
offensive manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge,
such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco.
Further, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation of bribery against respondent
Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing
conducted by Justice Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant Ocampo
confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case) should be
dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.[21] She cited Espaρol
v. Mupas,[22]
which held thus:
x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any
conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability
or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, nonetheless, we have
repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the
absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his or her official duties. In
administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to
prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare
indictment or mere speculation. The Court cannot give credence to charges
based on mere credence or speculation. As we held in a recent case:
Any administrative
complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that
the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment.
Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to
sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined
for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent.[23]
Findings in A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case)
Justice Salazar-Fernando
stated that in the Chang Tan Case, the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued
by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not be legally justified under R.A. No.
9262, because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.
The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA
on that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to "women and
their children," not to men. Thus,
while the TPO may be justified with respect to the protection accorded the
minor, the same is not legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert
Chang Tan. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against
his wife. Certainly, such a TPO
would be absurd. Hence, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to
be gross ignorance of the law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. in Officers and
Members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v.
Pamintuan,[24]
which stated, thus:
When
the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either
too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is
too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority (De
Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001). When the law
is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000).
Justice Salazar-Fernando
averred that as a family court judge, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua should be
the last person to err in the application of R.A. No. 9262, and, in this case, issue a TPO applied for a man, purportedly to
protect the latter against his wife. Such is unthinkable under
R.A. No. 9262. A careful evaluation of the records in the Chang Tan Case showed that there was not even any
allegation of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against her husband,
Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-Fernando found that the TPO against Stephanie,
insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of
petitioner, to cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or
threatening petitioner and to refrain from
acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health,
safety or welfare of petitioner, was anomalous.
Be that as it may, with
respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's reasons for granting custody
over subject minor to Albert Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly
conclusive, the evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor of Chang Tan was
substantial enough to warrant a prima facie determination that a TPO in
favor of the minor was necessary and would serve her paramount interest. Justice
Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper in respondent Judge's
reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and the
statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject minor herself, Rafi
Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie has not been a good influence to
her daughter, Rafi. As far as the
latter's paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person
to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's
award of temporary custody to the father could be justified. However, Justice
Salazar-Fernando stated that she does not necessarily affirm the correctness of
the custody award to the father, Chang Tan, since respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007 was annulled and set aside by the Twelfth
Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated October 31, 2007.[25]
In regard to the alleged
bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua allegedly
displayed in the said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no substantial evidence to support such
allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that respondent Judge received money from Chang Tan.
Moreover, not one of the
witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally witnessed the alleged heated
argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144,
except for their secondhand accounts that they heard that
such incident actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it speculative
to attribute the commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on such account. The Investigating Justice
stated that respondent Judge appeared to
have no personal or actual participation in that incident, because the
"heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC,
Victoria Jamora.
As regards respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in the RCBC
Case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no evidence against
respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the
circumstances surrounding her issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment,
particularly the manner in which she studied and evaluated the application for the
writ. Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced
that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily issued the ex parte hearing on the application
having been held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the writ
on the succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing impossible or
irregular in such feat. Per respondents account, she had been unofficially
reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she did not have to
evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling on the
propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering respondent's habit of immediately disposing
pending motions before her court, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister
significance to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The
Investigating Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the
writ of preliminary attachment to be apt.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the
absence of evidence that she was
motivated by any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed
her duties. She cited, thus:
In
administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Notatu
dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a
judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be
presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath
of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich. In a long line of cases decided by this
Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge
will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence
and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further held,
mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or
order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise
doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision
itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.[26]
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re:
Marriage Certificates and Monthly Reports)
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is
substantial evidence of an anomaly in
respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of marriages
in her court and failure to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports.
The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal
of the marriage certificates, which were said to have been contained in four
(4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time the
judicial audit was being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the
fact that she ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of
some garbage contained in blue plastic bags. However, as regards the timing of
disposal, she explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on
the second week of May, days before the judicial audit.[27]
Such fact was confirmed by Indicio in
his testimony.[28] He testified that he was ordered by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
to dispose of the garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage was due for
disposal on
The Investigating
Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose of the garbage was
indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why such a simple task of throwing
away a garbage of barely four plastic bags, which would take only a couple of
minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several days. Why no attempt to dispose
of the supposed garbage was made on May 9, 10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were
Saturday and Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was
the period of judicial audit) was not sufficiently explained. The logical
implication is that the order to dispose could not have been made on
CROSS-EXAMINATION
JUDGE CHUA:
You
mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you
executed an Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was also
done at 8:00 oclock in the morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When did I give my instruction to you to
throw away the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
You told me before the audit to throw all your trash.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Did you know when that particular day was?
MR. INDICIO:
That was election day, Your Honor.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Election day of May, 2007?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the
garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE CHUA:
May I draw
your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was subscribed to on May 17. So the last week that you mentioned here was
a week before May 17. You mentioned here
that last week, I was instructed by the Presiding Judge to dispose of the
garbage which were stocked in her branch.
Do you confirm the statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?
MR. INDICIO:
Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election
day.
JUDGE CHUA:
I am sorry,
Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight.
May I draw
your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here that the said garbage was
scheduled to be disposed last May 14, 2007.
However, since it was election day, same was not collected.
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, maam,
it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was only on May 17
that he had an opportunity to throw it.
JUDGE CHUA:
To clarify
the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to throw away
the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
I was told before the audit.
JUDGE CHUA:
The audit
was conducted on May 15 up to May 17.
Based on paragraph 2 of your Affidavit, I gave the instruction to you a
week before May 17, so I gave the instruction to you probably on May 10, is
that what you are saying?
MR. INDICIO:
I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge
Chua.
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
When you
told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already instructed you
to throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographers room, how many
days after that instruction was given to you did you comply with her
instruction?
MR. INDICIO:
Eight (8) days, Your Honor.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
So if you
instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that would be
May 9, is that correct?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, your Honor.[30]
According
to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the timing of the disposal, the manner of disposing the plastic bags of marriage certificates was also open to suspicion. Although there were four plastic bags ready for disposal, which
according to Indicio himself were really not too heavy,[31]
only one was taken out by the janitor to be disposed, leaving three other
plastic bags inside the courtroom. Taking
out the plastic bags one by one could have been purposely sought to
surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and avoid detection by the security personnel
detailed by the judicial audit team.
Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite
repeated references to the supposed garbage, which were allegedly contained in
similar plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the whereabouts of
the said plastic bags of garbage were never accounted for. If what were
mistakenly attempted to be disposed of by Indicio were the plastic bags
containing the marriage certificates,
the plastic bags containing the garbage could have been found elsewhere
in the courtroom. However, as things
turned out, there were really no plastic bags of garbage, but only more plastic
bags of marriage certificates. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's account of the
plastic bags of garbage was unsubstantiated.
The Investigating
Justice did not give credence to respondent Judges theory as to why the
plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in the stenographer's room, causing Indicio to
mistake it for the garbage which she supposedly ordered him to dispose of.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual
employee in her staff, who harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow money from her, could have been responsible in transferring
the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers
to the stenographer's room before her courtroom was padlocked. According to
her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative investigation on
her. Hence, to expose the big number of
weddings she had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s
machinations had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig could have
taken out the plastic bags of marriage
certificates from the small room in her chambers and transferred them to the
stenographer's room, so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can along the
corridor, the documents would be
discovered by the audit team.
Justice Salazar-Fernando
found respondent Judges theory difficult to
swallow. According to her, it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached
too much cunning to Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the
acts being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big
number of weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the
difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to do was
spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do, per respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.
In regard to the
non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, the certifications[32] issued by the Clerks of
Court of the MeTC and RTC of Makati City attest to the fact that out of the
1,975 marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages
were paid the corresponding solemnization fees. Justice Salazar-Fernando found no reason to doubt the reliability or
integrity of the said certifications, the contents of which were confirmed by
Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman, the same persons who personally verified
from their records whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were paid.
Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure
undertaken by Magsombol and Ticman in verifying the payment of solemnization
fees, positing that they could have merely relied on the dates of the wedding as
stated in the marriage certificates, which were often not the same dates stated
in the receipts. She contended that most parties paid their solemnization fee
on a date different from their wedding; hence, the dates of the receipts would
not be the same date as that of the wedding. Thus, respondent Judge postulated that
when Magsombol and Ticman verified
payment of the solemnization fees based
on the dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no receipt to show payment of the
solemnization fees, because payment was made on some other date.
Justice Salazar-Fernando
did not believe the foregoing postulation of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in the light of the categorical declarations
of Magsombol and Ticman that they did not merely based their verification on
the dates of the wedding, but,
specifically, they verified the payment of solemnization fees based on the names of the
contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent portions of the testimonies
of Magsombol and Ticman state as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
x x x x
ATTY. BUGTAS:
So
how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL;
I
checked the names that were handed to me one by one.
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
Did
you check all the records?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL:
Yes,
I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first day of January
2004 up to the last day of office of December 2005.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Are
your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to December 2005?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL:
Yes,
Your Honor.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
How
about the other basis which you said, receipts?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL:
In
our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Did
you also check those OR numbers and the receipts?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL:
Yes,
I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought with me, Your
Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
So in
the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC Judge were supposed
to be recorded in your daily cash collection book?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL:
Yes,
Your Honor, the ones that are being paid.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
So if
they are not paid, they do not appear in your book?
MR.
MAGSOMBOL:
Yes,
we dont know if the marriage happened or not.
xxxx
(Direct
Examination of Lucila D. Ticman)
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Did
you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the marriages that
were listed in the document were paid?
MS.
TICMAN:
Yes,
Your Honor.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
What
was the result of your verification?
MS.
TICMAN:
Only
20 parties paid the solemnization fees.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
Only
20? Twenty out of?
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
More
than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus.
x x x
x
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
What
was the basis of your findings?
MS.
TICMAN:
My
basis Your Honor is the one coming from the Supreme Court, and the names
supplied us by the Supreme Court were verified by us if they were paid or not.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
What
documents did you check to determine whether the fees were paid or not?
MS.
TICMAN:
The
Certificates of Marriage.
x x x
x
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
What
documents or records did you examine in order to determine the marriages that
paid the corresponding fees?
MS.
TICMAN:
The
logbook of the Accounting Section and official receipts.
x x x
x
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
Based
on your records or receipt that you have, you can inform the inquiring party
whether that person or party paid the corresponding fees or not?
MS.
TICMAN:
Yes,
sir.
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
In
the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on your records, you
enumerated just 20 marriages as appearing to have paid the corresponding fees.
MS.
TICMAN:
Yes,
sir.
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
But
based on the records available, the Supreme Court furnished you with a list
numbering around 1,344 names of parties for verification but you came out with
an Affidavit enumerating only those parties that paid the corresponding
fees. Is there a possibility that the
contracting parties paid the fees, but your records would not reflect their
names?
MS.
TICMAN:
No,
sir.
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
So
only those that paid will appear in your records.
MS.
TICMAN:
Yes,
sir.
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
If a
party did not pay, his or her name will not appear in your records?
MS.
TICMAN:
Yes,
sir.
xxxx
ATTY.
BUGTAS:
In
the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated that after a
thorough examination of the records of this office (referring to your office)
has been ascertained that only 20 marriages have been paid in the OCC RTC
Makati city, and you enumerated the 20 marriages that paid the corresponding
fees based on your records.
When
you say you thoroughly examined, can you tell us whether the examination was
thorough enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its contents?
MS.
TICMAN:
We
examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given by the Supreme
Court.[33]
Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully
convinced by the findings of Magsombol and Ticman that the solemnization fees
of a substantial number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
were unpaid.
As regards respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect
the marriages in her monthly reports, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent
Judges defense of forgery, nay tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She carefully perused respondent Judges
signatures in the monthly reports and compared the same to her signatures in
the pleadings, which she submitted during the investigation, as well as in the orders and
decisions contained in the records, and found no substantial discrepancies
therein or any indication that the same had been forged. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, while
all her signatures did not exactly appear to be 100 percent similar, there was
no reason to suppose that her signatures in the monthly reports and other
signatures extant in the records were not signed by one and the same person.
Moreover, Justice Salazar-Fernando failed to see any tell-tale signs of
tampering, and this could be the reason
why respondent Judge herself withdrew
such defense.
Justice Salazar-Fernando
disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua that the anomaly attributed to her was the
work of Umipig. The Investigating Justice
found it incredible that since
January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three years, Umipig
had been silently working on his sinister scheme, patiently and clandestinely
forging respondent Judge's signatures in her monthly reports as vengeance for not
lending him money. Justice
Salazar-Fernando found it difficult to imagine how Umipig could have harbored
such a deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just because the latter refused
to loan him money for his enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the
reason why Umipig failed to become a lawyer.
Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages allegedly coming from Umipig to show
the latter's extreme hatred of her. The
Investigating Justice stated that apart from the fact that it could not be
established that it was indeed Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of
the text messages did not show that Umipig was the author of all the anomalies relating to
the marriage certificates and monthly reports. Respondent Judge quoted Umipig
saying, "Hindi bale, may ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo,"
which, according to her, could only betray the fact that Umipig had indeed been
up to something. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando,
Umipigs statement could only confirm the existence of the anomalies in
respondent Judges court, rather than
attribute authorship to Umipig for the anomalies pertaining to the marriage
certificates and monthly reports.
Further, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas procedure of signing
the monthly reports ahead of her OIC to be irregular, since it is contrary to prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the monthly reports first before her OIC, Ms.
Mabalot, during her stint in the MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC. Respondent
Judge testified, thus:
x x x x
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Could you repeat the
statement?
JUDGE CHUA:
I signed the monthly
reports at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and then the following
morning at around 8:00 o clock, I would see the reports on top of the table of
Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus was on the typewritten name of
Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
And you expect the
reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you signed?
JUDGE CHUA:
Not necessarily, Your
Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael that I have signed the
monthly reports.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Do you have to sign
first before the clerk of court?
JUDGE CHUA:
With due respect to Mrs.
Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of court of MeTC Branch 63 was not
a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to the OCC a few months ago and
Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would rather do the checking
myself, sign and then require them to affix their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Contrary to the usual
procedure that the Judge would sign last?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
In your case, you sign
first before the OIC?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.[34]
Justice
Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent Judges justification for signing first
before her OIC, reasoning that it does
not take a lawyer to know what to
indicate in the monthly reports, let alone the mechanical task of indicating
how many cases were disposed or how many marriages were solemnized in a month.
As
regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code concerning the
place of solemnization of the marriage, the
Investigating Justice found no
evidence that would show that she disregarded the strictures of the said
provision. There is also no concrete evidence showing that respondent Judge
demanded and/or received money from the contracting parties for solemnizing the
marriage. However, it can be inferred
that respondent Judge financially benefited from solemnizing the numerous
marriages by the fact that
these were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and insufficient solemnizing
fees were paid to the court.
Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas
liability in this case, Justice
Salazar-Fernando stated:
x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator
respectfully submits that there is convincing and substantial evidence to
support a finding that anomalies were committed in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's
court with respect to the solemnization of marriages. The circumstances
magnificently fit together: plastic bags containing about 1,975 marriage
certificates were surreptitiously being spirited out of respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's court during the occasion of the judicial audit; when confronted,
the person seen disposing the plastic bags stated that he was acting upon the
order of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua; when verified, the solemnization fees of
the marriages covered by the said marriage certificates were found to have not
been paid; despite openly admitting having solemnized all the weddings covered
by the said marriage certificates, the monthly reports of respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua reflected only a very minimal number of weddings solemnized. Taken
together, the circumstances lead to no other conclusion that irregularities
were obviously perpetrated by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in solemnizing
marriages in her court.
In regard to
respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, Justice Salazar-Fernando found
sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her signatures in the monthly
reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to the correct number of weddings
solemnized by respondent Judge. Jamoras
justification that she could not have questioned respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua even if there were erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in
itself pregnant with admission that something anomalous could have indeed been
taking place. She testified, thus:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So
you affixed your signature without knowing whether the report is accurate or
not?
MS.
JAMORA:
Your
Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the position to question my superior
Judge Chua.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
So,
by force of circumstances, you just affixed your signature without any question
asked, whether they are correct, inaccurate, incomplete, you just affixed your
signature. Is that your job as OIC?
ATTY.
VILLANUEVA:
Your
Honor, I think she stated her position already in her Comment.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
That
is why I am asking her for confirmation.
MS.
JAMORA:
Yes,
Your Honor.
ATTY.
VILLANUEVA:
More
or less, that is the substance of her Comment, Your Honor.
JUSTICE
FERNANDO:
So
without knowing anything about the figures, you just affixed your signature
because you saw already the signature of Rafael and the signature of Judge
Chua?
MS.
JAMORA:
Yes,
Your Honor.[35]
Justice
Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent Jamora's pretended ignorance of
the incorrectness of the monthly reports she had been signing, let alone the figures relating to the number of
marriages solemnized by respondent Judge. He stressed that it does not take a lawyer to
count or at least approximate the number of weddings that respondent Judge had
been solemnizing in her court, considering the unusually big number of weddings
she had solemnized. Knowing the figures stated in the monthly reports to be
incorrect, Jamora condoned the wrongdoing, if she was actually not a
willing participant, by affixing her signatures therein.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the
reprehensible act or omission of
respondent Jamora constitutes dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct. Moreover,
she stated that during the investigation, it was revealed that although Jamora
was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no knowledge of her duties and
responsibilities, and had neither control over the employees under her nor did
what was expected of her.
Justice Salazar-Fernando
stated that respondent Jamora's plea for compassion and understanding, citing
the fact that she was not a lawyer and that the position of OIC Clerk of Court
was merely thrust upon her by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, which she
reluctantly accepted, was hollow, because her transgression did not have any
connection with her status as a non-lawyer or being a reluctant OIC. Her
insistence upon her ignorance or lack of knowledge of the incorrectness of the
figures stated in the monthly reports, specifically on the number of marriages
solemnized, aggravates her offense as it
makes a mockery of her oath.
The
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings of
Investigating Justice Salazar-Fernando.
It is settled that in administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[36]
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her
Monthly Reports[37]
the actual number of marriages she solemnized during her stint in the MeTC,
Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to the
number of marriages that were solemnized by her.
The monthly reports of cases on
record showed that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by
her compared with the marriage
certificates that were seized from her office.
Just to mention a portion of the
evidence submitted against her: In April
2004, she reported[38] that she did not
solemnized any marriage, but there were 29 marriage certificates issued on the said month contained in the plastic
bags that were taken from her office.[39] In May 2004, she reported[40] that she did not
solemnize any marriage, but 36 marriage certificates issued on the said month were found in the same
plastic bags.[41] In June 2004, she likewise reported[42] that she did not
solemnize any marriage, but 45 marriage certificates issued on the said month
were contained in the plastic bags.[43] From November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly
Reports[44] indicated that she did not solemnize any marriage, but
1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in the
custody of the Court.[45]
Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC,
In the light of the substantial
evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent
any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the Monthly Reports.
In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on the Monthly
Reports represented that she attested to
the correctness thereof; hence, it is presumed that she verified or should have
verified the facts stated therein. The
Monthly Reports specifically state that the signatories thereto, including
Victoria Jamora, declare under oath
that the information in this Monthly Report is true and correct to the best of
our knowledge, pursuant to the provisions of existing rules/administrative
circulars.
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144
from July 2005 to April 2007.[48] It is incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC,
was unaware of the big number of
weddings solemnized by respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007,
which totaled 1,068 marriages per the
confiscated marriage certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for
the said period that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice correctly
stated that she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were
incorrect, but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein,
if she was not actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge
Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are
guilty of gross misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court
upholds the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of
petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man
against his wife under R.A. No.
9292, known as the AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed,
as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the
Ocampo Case), the Court sustains the
recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the
absence of substantial evidence that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charge of harassment, grave
abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest
partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093
In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos
filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge Arcaya-Chua for
serious misconduct and dishonesty.
Complainant,
an aunt of respondent Judges husband, alleged that in the first week of
September 2002, she asked respondents help regarding the cases of her friend, Emerita Muρoz, pending before the
Supreme Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of
Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a
former employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court;
she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the
Court for the speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October
2002, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the
latters chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003,
respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10
million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00;
however, respondent could no longer be
contacted.[49]
In
her Comment dated P50,000.00 for a favorable resolution of Muρoz
cases. Respondent declined. Thereafter, complainant started spreading malicious
imputations against her. On P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which
letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant also told
respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she (respondent) was
corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent
filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust
Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against
her.[50]
The Court, in its
Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred
this case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the preliminary
conference held on September 4, 2007, complainant manifested her desire to move for
the dismissal of her complaint against respondent.[51] In a Verified
Manifestation[52]
dated September 6, 2007, complainant
stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a long
and serious discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that
after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on complainant that her accusation
against respondent was brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and
misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject of the present
administrative case; that for the sake of unity
and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and respondent
had reconciled and restored friendly relations with each other; and that in
view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in pursuing her
administrative case against respondent.
In her Report dated October 5, 2007,
Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative case in view of
paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by
the withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove
the allegations in her Complaint.
In a Resolution[53] dated December 5, 2007, the
Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed the complaint against respondent for
lack of evidence. The Court, in the same Resolution, also ordered complainant
to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an
unfounded verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent.
Complainant submitted her Compliance dated
January 6, 2008 stating that:
x x
x x
2. Contrary to the
impression of the Honorable Court, her
administrative complaint against Judge Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not
unfounded;
3. All the allegations
therein are true and based on respondents personal knowledge;
4.
The
main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was because of
the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity and
harmony in the family, given the fact that Judge Chuas husband is her nephew;
5.
On
several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their children
came to respondents house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later, respondents
sister, husband and children, as well as her close friends persuaded her to
forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake of peace and unity
in the family;
6.
It
is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that
respondent gave up her complaint against Judge Chua.[54]
In its
Resolution[55]
dated March 3, 2008, the Court found
that complainant's compliance was not satisfactory, and that she was trifling
with court processes. The Court then resolved to reprimand complainant with a
stern warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event
of a repetition of the same offense; recall the Resolution of the Court dated December 5,
2007; reopen the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice Rebecca
D. Salvador[56]
to conduct an investigation and submit her report and recommendation; and
directed complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under
pain of contempt of court.
In her Report dated
September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to
hold respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that respondent be
administratively penalized for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Justice Salvadors
findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, are as follows:
Justice
Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in
support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she
asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a
favorable decision on Muρoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting
complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason
for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the
protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred
complainant's ire for declining complainants request for favors in June 2004;
however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk
to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not
heard of Tolosa before; however, it was respondent's comment and her husband's
affidavit which stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that
Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was
respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who
Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and
associated with Muρoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of
Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muρoz was introduced to
them by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her
in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped
up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing
against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however, that respondent
at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters dated April
28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a
lawyer, to reply to complainants first demand letter, was unusual; considering
complainants advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that
complainant's motive for filing the administrative case was respondent's
refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the
latter's friend--was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to
expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the administrative
case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainants
compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why
she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against
respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and based on
personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their family's
pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against
respondent.[57]
During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008, Investigating Justice
Salvador observed that although complainant appeared weary of the demands
entailed by the administrative case, she staunchly stood pat over the veracity
of her complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same. According to Justice Salvador, respondent had
no reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely
instituted the administrative case against her.
Justice Salvador also
gave weight to complainants testimony that the return of the money by
respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the
complaint.
The Court sustained the
findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador, and rendered decision against
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 144,
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
that:
(1)
The Honorable Supreme
Court failed to appreciate the failure of Sylvia Santos to present Emerita Muρoz,
from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, in the
proceedings before Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador;
(2)
The Honorable Supreme
Court failed to appreciate that one of the bases for the dismissal of the
present case of 5 December 2007 was the Affidavit of Retraction filed by Muρoz
on 12 January 2006;
(3)
The Honorable Supreme
Court erred in sustaining the finding of Justice Salvador that [respondent] did
not refute Santos declaration during the clarificatory hearing that
[respondent] returned the money to her;
(4)
The Honorable Supreme
Court erred in sustaining the other findings of Justice Salvador; and
(5)
The Honorable Supreme
Court erred in not considering [respondents] testimonial and documentary
evidence.[59]
Respondent prayed
that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be directed to submit to this Court the fully
transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008
and to submit her tape of the proceedings on the said date, and that her motion
for reconsideration be granted and that the instant case be dismissed.
Respondents prayer for submission to this Court of the
fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17,
2008 is an attempt to clarify alleged
inaccuracies in the said transcript of stenographic notes. The Court notes that
respondent Judge had earlier filed a Motion dated
Respondent
filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008, claiming that there were significant
omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN)
particularly in the statement Ibinalik
naman ho nila ang pera; and that such question was also beyond the scope
of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous
testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did
she mention the return of the money, and it was only during the clarifiactory
hearing that it surfaces; thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to
cross-examine complainant. Respondent
prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of
complainant that the money was returned to me and ibinalik naman ho nila and pera be stricken off; and in case the
correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said
testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing and,
in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant.
In the Resolution dated
Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present
Emerita Muρoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, during
the proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos claims against her,
and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present case.
The
Court is not persuaded.
Santos
was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her
testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove
the administrative liability of respondent.
Contrary
to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the findings of
Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by her.
The
Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, thus:
x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to
respondents guilt is the unwavering stance of complainant that respondent did
solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a
favorable ruling in Muρoz cases.
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when
repeatedly asked during the hearing, was consistent in her testimony:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
At the start of this afternoons proceedings, you
affirmed the truth of the matters stated in your verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And according to you they are based on your personal
knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true.
That is all true.
x x x x
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano ba ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si
Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso niya.
Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi. Ang sabi niya, Sige, Tita, tutulungan ko.
Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Just tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00
at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa
iyo ang P50,000.00." Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi
ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang
nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya.
Sabi ko, "Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay
Emelita." Unang-una iyang Emelita may utang sa akin ng P20,000.00
sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this
point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue with her
testimony because she is already through with her direct examination.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the
record.
Complainant's
testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for
withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly pointed
out by Justice Salvador in her Report:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another
question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you
filed on
MS. SANTOS:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So it is not true
that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood or
misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po
iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga
ho, sa pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang
pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan
po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.[61]
These testimonies on
record are evidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The Investigating
Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a credible witness. It
is settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally
given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see
the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.[62] The Court found no reason to depart from such
rule since Justice Salvadors observations and
findings are supported by the records.
The
conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of
the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow
family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Canon
2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not
only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.
Canon
2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of
judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Canon
4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Administrative Sanctions
Any
disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based on the
provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,[63] while disciplinary
action against respondent
Victoria Jamora will be based on the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.
Under Section 8, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, serious charges
include gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and gross ignorance of the law
or procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent Judge is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A
fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense and punished
with dismissal for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141.
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively.
Respondent Judges motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
The Court has held:
All
those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the
exhortation that the administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest
levels, are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked
upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against injustice and oppression.
Those
who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity have
no place in the judiciary. xxx This Court will not withhold penalty when called
for to uphold the peoples faith in the judiciary.[64]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
holds that:
1. in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the
charges against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the
2.
in A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY
of gross ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office for six (6) months without salary and
other benefits.
3.
in A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of
SUSPENSION from office for a period
of six (6) months
without salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
4. in
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits,
excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality.
5. in
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144
is found GUILTY of grave
misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL
from the service, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, excluding accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.
Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn
S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora
of this decision, they are deemed to have vacated their respective office, and
their authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are
considered automatically terminated.
These consolidated administrative cases are
referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation regarding the possible disbarment of Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua
from the practice of the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
On
official leave
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
[1] Resolution
dated
[2] Rollo
(OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ), p. 253.
[3] Rollo (RTJ-07-2049), p. 17.
[4] Rollo
(OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ), p. 84.
[5] Rollo
(RTJ-07-2049), p. 24.
[6]
Other charges contained in the Memorandum dated
August 10, 2007 of the Court
Administrator to the Chief Justice, such
as the alleged irregularities in People v. Hiro Nakagawa (Crim. Case Nos.
06-148 to 154) and Paul Melvin Robles v.
Ida Perez Villanueva (Sp. Proc. M-6370), as well as respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chuas questionable recommendation of one of her staff, Maritess Dorado,
were not part of the Investigation per manifestation of the OCA that their
evidence was limited to the confiscated marriage certificates and Judge Arcaya-Chuas failure to reflect the
marriages she solemnized in her monthly reports.
[7] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049), p. 119.
[8] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 319.
[9] Subject:
Observance of the Statutory Requirements for Marriages and the Prescribed
Amounts of Fees for the Solemnization of Marriages.
[10] Annexes L to P.
[11] Exhibits 1 to 39.
[12] Exhibit A to BB.
[13] Rollo
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 465.
[14] TSN,
March 23, 2009, pp. 10-17, 60.
[15] Exhibits 1 to 23.
[16] Exhibits 24 to 28.
[17]
Exhibits "31" to "85."
[18] Emphasis
supplied.
[19] Records of SP No.
M-6375, pp. 70-72.
[20] Id. at 38.
[21] Daracan v.
Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447, September 27, 2000, 341 SCRA 161, 175.
[22] A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, November, 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 13,
37-38. (Emphasis supplied.)
[23] Emphasis supplied.
[24] A.M.
No. RTJ-02-1691, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 87.
[25] Records
(SP No. M-6372), Vol. IV, pp. 1447-1468.
[26] Mamerto Maniquiz
Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750, January 14, 2005, 448
SCRA 140, 155-156. (Emphasis supplied.)
[27] Supplemental Affidavit dated April 14, 2009; rollo (RTJ-08-2141), p. 497.
[28] TSN,
[29] Affidavit dated
[30] TSN,
[31] Id. at 47.
[32] Exhibits
H and I; rollo (A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141), pp. 216-219.
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] TSN,
[36] Vidallon-Magtolis
v. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005, 469 SCRA 439.
[37] Exhibits BB, CC-1 to CC-5, DD to NN, XX to
ZZ, AAA to GGG, X to Z, folder of exhibits.
[38] Exhibit XX, folder of exhibits.
[39] TSN,
[40] Exhibit YY, folder of exhibits.
[41] TSN,
[42] Exhibit ZZ, folder of exhibits.
[43]
TSN,
April 8, 2009, p. 20.
[44] Exhibits CC-4 to CC-5, DD to JJ, JJ-1 to JJ-5,
KK to MM, folder of exhibits.
[45] TSN,
[46] Exhibit H, folder of exhibits.
[47] Exhibit I-1, folder of exhibits.
[48] TSN,
[49] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093) , pp. 1-3.
[50]
[51] Id. at 61-62.
[52]
[53] Id. at. 292.
[54]
Id. at 305. (Emphasis supplied.)
[55] Id. at 307.
[56] In lieu of Justice Buzon, who was to retire on March 18,
2008.
[57]
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093),
pp. 400-401.
[58] Id. at 407.
[59]
Id. at 422.
[60]
Id.
at 402. (Emphasis supplied.)
[61] Id. at 403-405.
[62] Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, supra note 36.
[63] Rule 140 is entitled Discipline
of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan.
[64]
Concerned Lawyers of
Bulacan v. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos,
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 36, 62-63.